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IL

OF

CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition. R 175-177.
Relief should be granted because Appellant Albert Moore raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court erred in
summarily dismissing the claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to secure and present a
transcript from the guilty plea and sentencing in a prior Korth Dakota offense which was used to
enhance a misdemeanor DUI to a felony DUL Had counsel obtained and presented the North
Dakota transcript, the prior North Dakota offense, which was not a DUI, would not have been
found to be a substantially conforming foreign conviction for enhancement purposes.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts

In 1999, in Grand Forks, North Dakota, Mr. Moore pled guilty to violation ofN.D. Cent.
Code§ 39-08-01 (1997). State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,896,231 P.3d 523,541 (Ct. App.
2010). R 96-105. That statute provided:
1. A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access
for vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply:
a. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least ten onehundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the performance
of a chemical test within two hours after the driving or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-0 I ( 1997), as quoted in State v. Moore, supra.
When Mr. Moore pled guilty, he pied guilty to being in actual physical control of a

vehicle as opposed to driving. The Court asked for a factual basis and the North Dakota
prosecutor recited the following:
10/15/98 Officer observed the defendant slumped over the steering wheel of his
vehicle while parked in the lot of Mini Mart 42 nd A venue and University. Officer
made several attempts to gain attention of defendant and finally did.
Detected odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. Field sobriety tests
were requested. Defendant was combative and uncooperative. He refused all
tests. He was placed under arrest for Actual Physical Control.

R 98, In. 25-99, In. 9.
The North Dakota court sentenced Mr. Moore to six months in the correctional center
with all but 30 days suspended for two years; two years unsupervised probation. R I 02, In. 1215.
Then on September 3, 2006, Mr. Moore was arrested for DUI in Idaho, I.C. § 18-8004,
and DWP, I.C. § 18-8001. Eventually, on March 1, 2007, the DUI charge was elevated to a
felony based upon the state's allegation that Mr. Moore had been convicted as discussed above in
North Dakota in 1999 and had been convicted of DUI in Idaho in 2006. Moore, 148 Idaho at
890-91,231 P.3dat

5-36. R 131. Whilethatchargewaspending,onApril28,2007,Mr.

Moore was again arrested for DUI and charged with a felony based upon having two or more
prior convictions again based upon the 2006 Idaho and the 1999 North Dakota convictions.
Moore, supra. R 132.
On December 1, 2008, Mr. Moore entered an Alford1 plea to the 2006 charge, retaining
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and the issue of

1

North Carolina

V.

A{ford, 400 U.S. 25. 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).
2

whether the North Dakota conviction could properly be used to enhance the DUI chargc 2 .
Afoore, supra. R 132.

Throughout the proceedings in relation to this Alford plea, Mr. Moore has maintained that
he was not convicted of a DUI in North Dakota - rather he pied guilty to physical control

which is not the same as DUI in that state. 3 At his guilty plea hearing, when asked about the
North Dakota conviction, Mr. Moore stated, "Yes, sir. That was physical control." Tr. 12/1 /08
p. 79, In. 6-7. R 88. Upon closer questioning by the district court, Mr. Moore reiterated that he
pied guilty to physical control in North Dakota. Tr. 12/1/08 p. 88, In. 12-22. R 89.
Prior to entry of the plea in the 2006 case, the 2007 case went to trial. During that trial,
the district court held that the North Dakota statue was substantially conforming to the Idaho
DUI statute, and on July 8, 2008, Mr. Moore was convicted of felony DUI and sentenced to six
years (one fixed and five indeterminate) in the 2007 case. Moore, supra. R 133.

2

When accepting Mr. Moore's Alford plea, the court stated:

This is a conditional plea which means you're allowed to appeal those issues: the
speedy trial issue and also this DUI out of North Dakota....

. . . And so, if those go up on appeal and the court is reversed on either or both of
those decisions, then this case would come back. And it may very well be either
completely dismissed if you were not afforded a speedy trial or, certainly, it could
be reduced to a misdemeanor. ...
148 Idaho at 904,231 P.3d at 549, ftnt. 15. R 152.
3

As Mr. Defranco stated to the district court during the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment in this case: "l can tell you, if I can sum up my client's claim to this court in a
bumper sticker, it would be that a North Dakota Physical Control crime is not a DUI in any state,
in any place, in any way, shape, or form." Tr. 11/18/11, p. 15, In. 15-19.
3

After the plea was entered in the 2006 case, Mr. Moore was sentenced to six years (one
fixed and five indeterminate) to run concurrently with the sentence on the 2007 case. 1\doore,
supra. R 132.

Mr. Moore appealed from both convictions and the appeals were consolidated. Moore,
supra. R 130-152. The Court of Appeals first addressed the 2007 case, vacating that conviction

because the unauthenticated North Dakota judgment of conviction was erroneously admitted.
Moore, 148 Idaho at 892-894, 231 P.3d at 537-539. R 136. The Court then remanded the 2006

case for possible reduction to a misdemeanor in accord with the conditions in the Alford plea.
148 Idaho at 903-4, 231 P.3d 548-9. R 1
The Court of Appeals also offered an advisory opinion that the North Dakota conviction
would be a substantially conforming conviction for enhancement purposes. 148 Idaho at 896,
231 P.3d at 541. R 139-144. 4 Of import to the Court of Appeals' advisory opinion was its
observation, "Moore does not claim that his conduct in North Dakota which gave rise to the DUI
charge would not be a crime in Idaho." 148 Idaho 898,231 P.3d 543, ftnt. 13. R 144.
Following issuance of the remittitur in the consolidated appeals, the 2007 case was
amended to a misdemeanor and Mr. Moore was sentenced to 365 days with credit for 365 days
time served. ROA CR-FE-2008-00374.
With regard to the 2006 case, the district court held upon remand that Mr. Moore's

4

The Supreme Court has since held that advisory opinions are not allowed. See State v.
Afonzanares, 152 Idaho 410,419,272 P.3d 382,391 (2012), refusing to give an advisory opinion
in a situation similar to Mr. Moore's where the state could decide to pursue the case following a
decision in the appellant's favor. "[R]uling on the Firearm Charge issue has no practical effect
on this appeal and would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Id (emphasis original), citing
State v. Barclay, 149 ldaho 6, 9,232 P.3d 327,330 (2010). See also, State v. Long, 153 Idaho
168, 280 P.3d 196 (Ct. App. 2012), declining to issue an advisory opinion.
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reservations in his guilty pica did not include cvidentiary error and effectively denied Mr.
Moore's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr 6/9/10, p. 1, In 1 - p. 7, In. 11. R 158-161. The
district court entered an amended judgment of conviction and resentenced Mr. Moore to a five
year term with one year fixed. Neither Mr. Moore nor the state appealed. State v. J\;foore, 152
Idaho 203,204,268 P.3d 471,472 (Ct. App. 2011).
About six months later, the state filed a motion to "correct an apparent clerical mistake,"
and the district court entered a second amended judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of
six years with one fixed. Id.
Mr. Moore appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the second amended judgment of
conviction. Id.
In the meantime, Mr. Moore filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 2006 case,
which was dismissed. Mr. Moore appealed that dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in
an unpublished decision. Moore v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 647, filed September
17, 2012.
While that appeal was pending, Mr. Moore filed the successive petition at issue in this
appeal. R 5-16. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. R 67-107.
The amended petition raises seven claims for relief:
1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to substantiate her objection to use of
the North Dakota case as a predicate prior by obtaining and presenting the transcript of the North
Dakota plea hearing;
2) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to adequately preserve the objection to
the use of the North Dakota prior offense, thereby rendering Mr. Moore's conditional guilty plea

5

involuntary, unintelligent and unknov,fog;
3) Ineffeetive assistanee of trial eounsel in not objeeting to the predieate offense as an
uneounseled misdemeanor used to enhanee a subsequent felony;
4) Ineffeetive assistanee of eounsel in failing to appeal from the amended judgment of
eonvietion entered on June 11, 201 0;
5) Ineffeetive assistanee of eounsel in failing to move to withdraw Mr. Moore's guilty
plea following the pronouneement of sentenee on June 9, 201 0;
6) Ineffective assistanee of eounsel in failing to offer evidenee of the North Dakota
transeript at the June 9, 2010, hearing to support the objeetion to use of the North Dakota ease as
a predieate offense for a felony;
7) Ineffeetive assistanee of trial and appellate eounsel in failing to ehallenge the distriet
eourt's authority to enter the Seeond Amended Judgment of Convietion.
R 68-71.
Mr. Moore later voluntarily withdrew the seventh elaim. Tr. 11/18/11 p. 17, In. 20-24.
Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were all summarily dismissed. The distriet eourt found that the
question of whether a prior eriminal violation is substantially eonforming is a question of law;
that trial eounsel adequately preserved the issue for appeal; that trial eounsel was not required to
provide a transeript of the plea to the North Dakota offense; that eounsel' s5 aetions did not fall
below an objeetive standard for reasonableness; and that the failure to present the North Dakota

Mr. Moore has been represented by many attorneys throughout these proeeedings. See
Tr. 6/12/08 p. 1-13, diseussing the history of the proeeedings to that date, noting the names of
several different appointed eounsei. As Judge Me Laughlin noted, the ease already had '·a bit of a
eolorful history to it." Tr. 6/12/08, p. 13, In. 3-4.
6

transcript in the district court did not adversely

the defense. R l 67-17 l.

The district court wrote:
The Petitioner has laid out in all of his claims ipeffecti~e assistance of counsel
and in the process of doing so has made conclusory statements in his Petition. As
to Petitioner's first claim, the Court will grant summary dismissal. Whether a
foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a question of law to be
determined by the court. I.C. § 18-8005(8). The Court of Appeals exercised free
review over the trial court's determination as a matter of law and determined that
the North Dakota statute underlying Petitioner's 1999 conviction substantially
confonned to LC. § 18-8004. The Court will find that Petitioner's trial counsel
adequately preserved the issue for appeal, was not required to provide a transcript
of Petitioner's plea to the North Dakota crime, did not fall below an objective
standard for reasonableness, and did not adversely affect Petitioner's defense by
omitting to provide the transcript in the trial record. As such, the Court will also
grant summary dismissal as to Petitioner's second, fifth, and sixth claims for
relief, as a decision to provide a transcript of Petitioner's plea to the North Dakota
crime did not have a reasonable probability of changing the Court of Appeal's
determination that the North Dakota statute substantially confmmed to LC. § 188004.

R 168-69.
Mr. Moore immediately appealed from the summary dismissal. R 175-177.
Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on the fourth claim of ineffective assistance
in failing to file a notice of appeal and that claim was also dismissed. R 184.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of ineffective
assistance of counsel given that Mr. Moore raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and present evidence that he
did not have a prior DUI conviction in North Dakota?

7

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief
1. Standard of Review

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d
4 76, 482 (2008).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either
pursuant to a party's motion or upon the court's own initiative, if"it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of facts, together with
any affidavit submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." LC.§ 19-4906(c). When considering summary
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is
not required to accept the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P Jd
123, 136 (2008). Moreover, because the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in
the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district court is not constrained to draw inferences in the
petitioner's favor, but is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Yakovac, 145Idahoat444, 180P.3dat483; Wolfv.State, 152Idaho64,67,266P.3d
1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Hayes v. State, 146 ldaho

355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App.

2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is

8

sufficient to justify them. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,218, 192 P.3d 1036, 1042 (2008);
Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.2d at 714.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven
by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not
justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
Summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate only when the
court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all the
disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136.
If the petition, affidavits and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true,

would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P .3d 1108, 1111 (2004 ); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho
932,934,801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521,236
P.3d at 1281.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate court applies the same
standards used by the trial courts and examines whether the petitioner's admissible evidence
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,
675, 227 P.3d 925, 929(2010). Questions oflaw are subject to free review. Rhoades v. State,
148 Idaho 24 7, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial.

9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the

petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172,254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). To
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Strategic decisions of trial counsel
will not be second-guessed unless based upon inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law,
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id.
2. Argument
Mr. Moore raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's failure to obtain
and present the North Dakota transcript fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
was prejudicial. Given that a genuine issue of material fact existed, summary dismissal was
improper.
a. Counsel's performance was deficient
The American Bar Association (ABA) standards reflect the prevailing norms of practice
and are guides in determining whether counsel's representation is reasonable. Murphy v. State,
143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006).
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case
and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should include
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused
admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the
accused's stated desire to plead guilty.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function,§ 4-4.l(a) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis
added).

10

the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the court considers not only
the quantum of evidence known to defense counsel, but also whether the known evidence would
lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Murphy, supra, citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510,
v. lvfa!hews, l

S.Ct. 2527, 2538 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; State
Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999) ("counsel has a duty to make a

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes paiticular investigations
unnecessary").
Strategic choices made after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far as
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Afurphy, 143 Idaho
at 146, 139 P.3d at 748, citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 1
545 U.S. 374, 382, 1

S.Ct. at 2541; Rompilla v. Beard,

S.Ct. 2456, 2463 (2005) (failure to investigate material relied upon by

prosecution was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514
(2000) (unreasonable failure to conduct thorough investigation). See also, Knutsen v. State, 144
Idaho 433,443, 163 P.3d 222, 232 (Ct. App. 2007) (petitioner raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether counsel's performance in failing to obtain and present his grandmother's
testimony and mental health evidence was objectively unreasonable).
In this case, Mr. Moore repeatedly stated that he only pied guilty to physical control, not
DUI, in North Dakota. R 10, R 51. Moreover, Mr. Moore alleged in his amended petition that
trial counsel was aware of the dispute regarding the North Dakota conviction because she
attempted to preserve it as an issue in the conditional guilty plea. R 68.
Yet, despite the knowledge that the question of whether the North Dakota conviction was
a conviction for DUI would determine whether Mr. Moore would be facing misdemeanor or

11

felony charges, counsel did not secure and present in court the transcripts of the North Dakota
guilty plea and sentencing hearing.
Counsel failed to obtain and present this transcript even though at the time Mr. Moore
entered his Alford plea, the law was clear in North Dakota that DUI and being in actual physical
control (APC) were not the same offense, North Dakota v. Huber, 555 N.W.2d 791 (1996), and
that APC convictions do not require that the vehicle be operable or even that the defendant have
access to the keys of the vehicle. See, Rist v. North Dakota Dept. OfTransp., 665 N.W.2d 45, 51
(2003) ("We have frequently upheld APC convictions even when the vehicles were inoperable.").

See also, State

v.

Haverluk, 617 N.W.2d 652, 656 (2000) ("We have frequently upheld APC

convictions even when the vehicles were inoperable or the operator had no intent to drive."); City

of Pargo v. Novotny, 562 N.W.2d 95 (1997) (upholding conviction for APC where defendant was
asleep next to his girlfriend in the driver's seat of a rented truck which was neither moving nor
on with his pants unzipped and testified that he had never intended to drive the truck but that he
and his girlfriend had engaged in oral sex there and then he had fallen asleep); Hawes v. North

Dakota Dept. ofTransp., 741 N.W.2d 202 (2007) (fact that vehicle had no gas in it did not
preclude conviction for APC).
Counsel did not investigate and present evidence regarding the North Dakota conviction
even though the factual basis for the >forth Dakota conviction would not amount to the factual
basis for a crime in Idaho.
While one could be found guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated in North Dakota while sitting in an inoperable car with no car keys. one could
not be found guilty of DUI in Idaho in those same circumstances. While one could be found

12

guilty in North Dakota of actual physical control for being asleep and slumped over the steering
wheel in a vehicle that was neither moving nor on, one could not be found guilty of DUI in Idaho
under those circumstances. DUI and APC are not the same offense in North Dakota and
counsel's failure to know this and to investigate and present evidence that Mr. Moore did not
have a prior DUI in North Dakota was not objectively reasonable.
Historically, the failure of counsel to investigate a prior conviction and know the law
applied to that prior conviction has been found unreasonable. Ex parte Felton, 815 S.W.2d 733,
736 (Tex. App. 1991) (failure to investigate prior conviction and know the law to be applied to
that prior was ineffective); Ex parte Harrington, 310 S. W.3d 452 (Tex. App. 2010) (failure to
conduct even cursory investigation into defendant's claim that 1986 conviction for DWI did not
belong to him, which conviction was used to enhance subsequent offense to felony DWI was
deficient performance); People v. Cotton, 239 Cal.App. 1072, 1084 (Cal. App. 1991)
("Whenever a sentence is enhanced or probation is revoked due to a prior conviction, it is
counsel's obligation to examine the validity of the prior or underlying conviction. Counsel's first
duty is to investigate the facts of his client's case and to research the law applicable to those
facts."); Graham v. State, 952 P.2d 1266 (Kan. 1998) (failure to raise issue of voluntariness of
plea to an out of state charge was deficient performance).
In this case, Mr. ::VIoore did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's
failure to investigate the nature of the prior conviction that the state was relying upon to enhance
the misdemeanor DUI to a felony DUI was deficient performance.
b. The deficient performance was prejudicial

Likewise, Mr. Moore raised a genuine issue of material fact as to "vhether counsel's

13

deficient performance was prejudicial. Had counsel presented evidence that Mr. Moore did not
have a DUI in North Dakota, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of this case would
have been different - the state could not have relied upon the No1ih Dakota conviction and
without that prior, Mr. Moore could have resolved this case as a misdemeanor before a
conviction in the 2007 case and thus avoided a felony in this case. 6
Idaho Code § 18-8005(6) 7 makes a third DUI a felony. A second DUI is a misdemeanor.
LC. § 18-8005( 4). While foreign criminal convictions can be used to enhance DUis in Idaho, the
foreign convictions must be substantially conforming to Idaho law. LC. § 18-8005( 6).
The charge in this case was elevated to a felony based on the North Dakota conviction on
March 1, 2007. At that time, no appellate case had yet considered the question of what
constitutes a substantially conforming foreign criminal conviction. Had counsel presented the
North Dakota transcript showing that Mr. Moore was convicted of being in actual physical
control without any proof that the vehicle was running or moving, the district court would have
held that the North Dakota conviction was not a substantially conforming foreign criminal
conviction - because what Mr. Moore did was not illegal in Idaho.
In July 2007, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 172 P.3d 555

6

Mr. Moore recognizes that under State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641,239 P.3d 34 (Ct. App.
2010), a previous conviction for DUI can be used as the basis for conviction of felony DUI, even
though the conduct involved in the felony DUI occurred between the conduct which resulted in
the first and second DUI convictions. However, the offense in this case was elevated to a felony
based upon the North Dakota conviction on March 1, 2007. He was not convicted on the 2007
cased until July 8, 2008. Thus, there was a window of 16 months for counsel to present the
North Dakota transcripts and get this case resolved as a misdemeanor prior to any other
conviction being available to use to enhance to a felony.
7

Prior to 2009, I.C. § 18-8005(6) was designated as I.C. § 18-8005(5). 2009 Idaho
Session Laws 597.
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(Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the Court held as a matter of first impression that a Montana felony
DUI could be used to enhance a DUI charge in Idaho. In making that decision. the Court referred
to several out of state decisions including United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2004),
which held that a prior Maryland conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes in
Virginia. In finding that the Montana conviction could be used for enhancement purposes in
Idaho, the Court of Appeals distinguished the Thomas case. The Court wrote:

It is possible that a DUI violation in Idaho would not result in a violation in
Montana under Idaho's standard because of Montana's rebuttable inference
provision. However, a violation in Montana automatically results in a violation in
Idaho. This Court is presented with the inverse situation from that presented to the
Fourth Circuit in Thomas, discussed above. That court determined that the lack of
rebuttable presumption in Maryland disqualified the conviction from being used
for enhancement purposes in Virginia under a strict substantially similar standard.
United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 198 (4 th Cir. 2004 ). In this case the
rebuttable inference in Montana does not stop the Idaho court from using the prior
conviction for enhancement purposes.
144 Idaho at 805, 172 P .3d at 560, ftnt. 1.
This distinction indicates that if the appellate court was presented with a situation such as
Mr. Moore's, where an out-of-state conviction was for activity which would not be illegal in
Idaho, the court would hold, as did the Fourth Circuit, that the out-of-state conviction was not a
substantially conforming foreign conviction for enhancement purposes.
Eventually, Mr. Moore's case itself came before the Court of Appeals. Moore, 148 Idaho
887,231 P.3d 532. In his appeal, Mr. Moore argued that his prior conviction in North Dakota
was not a substantially conforming foreign conviction. However, applying Schmoll, the Court of
Appeals rejected Mr. Moore's argument.
Because trial counsel had not entered the North Dakota transcript into the record, Mr.
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Moore's appellate counsel could only argue to the Com1 of Appeals that to be substantially
conforming, a foreign DUI statute may never encompass conduct that would not be illegal under
Idaho's DUI scheme. 148 Idaho at 897, 231 P.3d at 542. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument stating that such a strict interpretation would deviate from the general thrust of Schmoll
and l.C. § 18-8005(8). 148 Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that "Moore does not
claim that his conduct in North Dakota which gave rise to the DUI charge would not be a crime
in Idaho." 148 Idaho at 543,231 P.3d at 898, ftnt. 13. In specifically noting this, the Court was
indicating that had Mr. Moore had evidence to support an argument that his conduct in North
Dakota was not illegal in Idaho, the analysis and its result would have been different.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Moore did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial.
c. Remedy
The district court summarily dismissed Claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 based upon its erroneous
conclusion that counsel was not deficient and that there was no prejudice to Mr. Moore. As set
out above, Mr. Moore did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's failure to
obtain and present to the court the North Dakota transcript was deficient performance that
prejudiced him. Mr. Moore asks this Court to reverse the order granting the state's motion for
summary dismissal and remand with directions to grant the petition and vacate his conviction.

]6

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the order granting summary
dismissal and remand with directions to grant the petition and vacate the conviction.

,<

Respectfully submitted this

A:>aay of October, 2012.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Albert Mo e
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